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BACKGROUND
The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation (CMMI) launched the Bundled 
Payments for Care Improvement (BPCI) initiative in 2013. A subsequent study 
showed that the initiative was associated with reductions in Medicare payments 
for total joint replacement, but little is known about the effect of BPCI on medical 
conditions.
METHODS
We used Medicare claims from 2013 through 2015 to identify admissions for the 
five most commonly selected medical conditions in BPCI: congestive heart failure 
(CHF), pneumonia, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), sepsis, and 
acute myocardial infarction (AMI). We used difference-in-differences analyses to 
assess changes in standardized Medicare payments per episode of care (defined as 
the hospitalization plus 90 days after discharge) for these conditions at BPCI hos-
pitals and matched control hospitals.
RESULTS
A total of 125 hospitals participated in BPCI for CHF, 105 hospitals for pneumo-
nia, 101 hospitals for COPD, 88 hospitals for sepsis, and 73 hospitals for AMI. At 
baseline, the average Medicare payment per episode of care across the five condi-
tions at BPCI hospitals was $24,280, which decreased to $23,993 during the inter-
vention period (difference, −$286; P = 0.41). Control hospitals had an average pay-
ment for all episodes of $23,901, which decreased to $23,503 during the 
intervention period (difference, −$398; P = 0.08; difference in differences, $112; 
P = 0.79). Changes from baseline to the intervention period in clinical complexity, 
length of stay, emergency department use or readmission within 30 or 90 days 
after hospital discharge, or death within 30 or 90 days after admission did not 
differ significantly between the intervention and control hospitals.
CONCLUSIONS
Hospital participation in five common medical bundles under BPCI was not associ-
ated with significant changes in Medicare payments, clinical complexity, length of 
stay, emergency department use, hospital readmission, or mortality. (Funded by 
the Commonwealth Fund.)
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Episode-based payment holds promise for improving the quality and efficiency of care. The Center for Medicare and Med-
icaid Innovation (CMMI) launched the Bundled 
Payments for Care Improvement (BPCI) initiative 
in 2013.1 BPCI is a voluntary program, and hos-
pitals that choose to participate may select from 
several models. Under model 2, the most popu-
lar model among hospitals, participating hospi-
tals assume accountability for the costs of all 
care within 30, 60, or 90 days after hospitaliza-
tion for 1 or more of 48 conditions that togeth-
er account for approximately 70% of Medicare 
spending.2 Hospitals may choose the conditions 
and the time window. If cost targets are achieved, 
participating hospitals keep a portion of the sav-
ings; if cost targets are exceeded, participating 
hospitals reimburse Medicare for part of the 
difference.
BPCI is a large demonstration project, with 
hundreds of participating hospitals, and has 
enjoyed bipartisan support. The Department of 
Health and Human Services has announced that 
a closely related version of the project (BPCI Ad-
vanced) will be launched at the beginning of 
fiscal year 2019.3 Despite the importance of epi-
sode-based payment, however, there has been 
little research examining its efficacy or deter-
mining whether it has unintended consequences, 
such as hospitals’ selecting patients with rela-
tively less complex conditions to reduce costs 
and improve outcomes. A previous peer-reviewed 
evaluation of the program,4 which was restricted 
to patients hospitalized for joint replacement, 
showed a modest reduction in Medicare-allowed 
payments, no decrease in the complexity of cases 
treated at BPCI hospitals, and no change in mor-
tality. Evaluations performed by a federal con-
tractor have had similar findings.5,6 Because 
BPCI and BPCI Advanced include a wide variety 
of clinical conditions, there is a critical need for 
information on how bundled-payment models 
might change patterns of care for medical con-
ditions.
We aimed to fill this gap by studying the five 
most common medical bundles under BPCI: con-
gestive heart failure (CHF), pneumonia, chronic 
obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), sepsis, 
and acute myocardial infarction (AMI). Patients 
with these conditions account for nearly two 




There are four participation models in BPCI; 
more than 95% of participating hospitals are in 
model 2.1 Under BPCI, hospitals are paid fee-for-
service rates, but Medicare-allowed payments are 
retrospectively reconciled against targets on a 
quarterly basis. Target prices are based on his-
torical spending, minus a discount of 2 to 3%, 
depending on the episode length chosen by the 
hospital.
The Commonwealth Fund, which provided 
funding for the study, had no role in its design 
or conduct; the collection, management, analysis, 
or interpretation of the data; the preparation, 
review, or approval of the manuscript; or the 
decision to submit the manuscript for publica-
tion. The requirement for informed consent was 
waived because the data were deidentified. The 
study was approved by the Office of Human Re-
search Administration at the Harvard T.H. Chan 
School of Public Health.
BPCI Participants
We obtained from CMMI publicly available lists 
of participating hospitals in the BPCI initiative, 
their start date for financial incentives, and the 
date they planned to terminate participation. 
From these lists, we identified hospitals enrolled 
by July 1, 2015, in bundles for CHF, pneumonia, 
COPD, sepsis, or AMI. These data were linked 
both to hospital characteristics, obtained from 
the 2014 American Hospital Association file, 
and to market characteristics such as availability 
of post–acute care services and median income 
levels, obtained from the Area Resource File. For 
each hospital, market share was calculated as 
the proportion of all admissions in the county 
for the condition of interest. Market competi-
tiveness was calculated with the use of the 
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index7 (Table 1).
Control Hospitals
To identify control hospitals, we used a modifi-
cation of the approach used in a previous study 
of BPCI.4 With the use of propensity scores 
based on market and hospital characteristics, as 
well as baseline rates of discharge to skilled 
nursing facilities and of readmissions, each hos-
pital participating in BPCI was matched without 
replacement with up to three control hospitals 
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whose log-odds propensity scores were within 
0.515 of the log-odds propensity score for the 
BPCI hospital. We chose this difference of 0.515 
to be consistent with the previous work in this 
area4 and because it falls within the recom-
mended difference of 0.84,8 which is based on 
the pooled standard deviation of our log-odds 
propensity scores multiplied by 0.2. Nonpartici-
pating hospitals were excluded if they were not 
paid through the inpatient prospective-payment 
system or if they participated in any other bun-
dling model or for any other condition in BPCI.
Patient Identification
We used Medicare inpatient files from January 1, 
2013, through September 30, 2015, to identify 
index admissions for CHF (Medicare Severity 













P Value,  




Mean no. of bundles per hospital 2.6 NA NA
≥2 bundles (% of hospitals) 62.6 31.7 NA
Mean discharges (no. per hospital) 153.3 146.1 0.34 102.2 <0.001
Mean 90-day episode payment in 2013  
(U.S. dollars)
23,161 22,664 0.33 21,977 0.02
Type of hospital (%)
Nonprofit 74.6 76.5 0.43 64.9 <0.001
Public 2.4 3.6 0.25 15.7 <0.001
For-profit 23.0 19.9 0.18 19.4 0.049
Teaching 47.2 48.7 0.59 32.1 <0.001
Urban location (%) 100 100 1.00 91.0 <0.001
Geographic region (%)
Northeast 28.9 30.2 0.61 15.9 <0.001
Midwest 14.6 16.8 0.29 23.7 <0.001
South 27.2 24.9 0.35 42.4 <0.001
West 29.3 28.1 0.63 18.0 <0.001
Disproportionate-share hospital (%) 29.2 29.7 0.59 29.2 0.92
Mean size (no. of beds) 322 315 0.61 229 <0.001
Market characteristics
Median household income (U.S.  
dollars)
56,174 57,002 0.29 51,114 <0.001
Medicare enrollees who are in Medicare 
Advantage plans (%)
29.7 29.1 0.41 26.5 <0.001
Skilled nursing facilities (total no.  
of beds)
5922 5963 0.93 3638 <0.001
Hospital market share 0.31 0.32 0.73 0.50 <0.001
HHI 0.14 0.14 0.76 0.13 0.19
*  All data on hospital and market characteristics are from 2013. Markets were defined on the basis of counties. HHI de-
notes Herfindahl–Hirschman index (defined as the sum of the squares of each provider’s market share, with a perfectly 
competitive market having an HHI near zero and a completely concentrated market having an HHI of 1), and NA not 
applicable.
Table 1. Baseline Hospital and Market Characteristics.*
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pneumonia (MS-DRGs 177–179 and 193–195), 
COPD (MS-DRGs 190–192, 202, and 203), sepsis 
(MS-DRGs 870–872), and AMI (MS-DRGs 280–
282) at participating hospitals and matched con-
trol hospitals. We included only beneficiaries who 
were continuously enrolled in Medicare Parts A 
and B during their episode of care and excluded 
those with Medicare eligibility because of end-
stage renal disease. Claims contained demo-
graphic characteristics, principal discharge diag-
noses, coexisting conditions, and service use.
For each index hospitalization, standardized 
Medicare-allowed payments for episodes of care 
(defined as the hospitalization plus 90 days after 
discharge), hereafter referred to as Medicare 
payments, were calculated with the use of 100% 
of claims for inpatient care, skilled nursing facil-
ity care, home health agency services, and durable 
medical equipment, as well as a 20% random 
sample of claims for outpatient services and 
physician fees. Standardized payments specified 
by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Ser-
vices (CMS) reflect a process that removes differ-
ences in payment according to a wage index, as 
well as differences with respect to payments for 
indirect costs of medical education, payments to 
disproportionate-share hospitals (i.e., hospitals 
providing a disproportionate share of care to 
Medicare beneficiaries and uninsured patients), 
and other special payments. Total payments were 
Winsorized at the 95th percentile of national 
episode payments and adjusted for inflation to 
prices in 2015. Because less than 5% of hospitals 
chose 30- or 60-day episodes, we analyzed only 
90-day episodes, which is consistent with the 
previous peer-reviewed evaluation.4
Study Period
We considered baseline to be 9 months to 3 months 
(a 6-month period) before each hospital’s start 
date, with the intervention period starting im-
mediately after the start date. The intervention 
period ranged from 3 to 9 months according to 
the enrollment date. For example, hospitals that 
started in January 2015 or earlier had a full 
9-month intervention period (since we required 
3 months of follow-up for each patient, and our 
claims data extended through December 2015); 
those that started in April 2015 had only a 
6-month intervention period. The mean interven-
tion period was 7 months in our main analyses.
Outcomes
Our primary outcome was the change in stan-
dardized Medicare payments per episode. Second-
ary outcomes included changes in hospital case 
mix (based on the mean Chronic Conditions 
Warehouse score [a Medicare-provided comor-
bidity index that ranges from 0 to 27, with 
higher scores indicating more coexisting condi-
tions]), per-hospital case volume, proportion of 
patients dually enrolled in Medicare and Med-
icaid (as an indicator of poverty), proportion of 
patients with disabling conditions, changes in 
the individual components of payment (for the 
index hospitalization, subsequent inpatient and 
outpatient care, and physician fees), and changes 
in length of stay, emergency department use, 
readmissions, and mortality.
Statistical Analysis
Hospital and market characteristics were com-
pared between BPCI hospitals and matched con-
trol hospitals with the use of appropriate statis-
tical tests. We used a difference-in-differences 
approach to examine changes in each outcome 
from the baseline period to the intervention peri-
od. To validate this approach we compared slopes 
for the 15-month period before the intervention 
between BPCI hospitals and control hospitals and 
found no significant differences in Medicare pay-
ments for all five conditions combined or any of 
the individual conditions (see Table S1 in the 
Supplementary Appendix, available with the full 
text of this article at NEJM.org). For each control 
hospital, the time periods were identical to those 
of the matched BPCI hospital. Analyses were run 
at the patient level, with each outcome in a sepa-
rate model. Time was the primary predictor, cod-
ed as a binary variable for baseline versus inter-
vention periods, along with BPCI status, and the 
interaction term between these indicators. The 
significance of the interaction term determined 
whether there had been a greater change in any 
outcome in patients at BPCI hospitals than in 
patients at control hospitals. Marginal models 
that use generalized estimating equations (the 
GENMOD procedure in the SAS statistical pack-
age) was the approach used to account for cor-
relation among patients within hospitals. We 
included indicator variables for DRGs and used 
individual Chronic Conditions Warehouse scores 
to control for coexisting conditions.
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For overall costs, we ran hospital-level analy-
ses, since data on payments for outpatient ser-
vices and physicians were available for only 20% 
of patients, whereas data on all other payments 
were available for 100% of patients. We used 
linear regression to estimate outpatient and phy-
sician payments for each hospital and separately 
to estimate mean “other” payments for each hos-
pital. We then evaluated the resulting total ad-
justed mean costs in a linear regression model. 
Analyses were weighted by the number of patients 
in each hospital for each time period. A more 
detailed description is provided in the Supple-
mentary Appendix.
All analyses were carried out first across all 
five conditions and then separately for each con-
dition. We performed two sets of sensitivity 
analyses. First, we limited hospital-condition 
pairs to hospitals that did not drop out of BPCI 
early for the condition in question (287 hospi-
tals). Second, to determine whether performance 
improved with the duration of participation, we 
limited the analytic sample to hospitals that 
joined the program by January 1, 2015 (45 hos-
pitals), examining performance after a 6-month 
run-in period and using all available data 
through the end of 2015. For this group, our 
mean intervention period was 16 months.
Our primary outcome, the change in total 
Medicare payments per episode, was tested in 
six patient cohorts, so the Hochberg–Benjamini 
method of using a stepped P value to adjust for 
multiple comparisons9 allowed us to determine 
statistical significance. In six comparisons (the 
five individual conditions plus all conditions 
combined), the largest change (rank 1) in P value 
was 0.05 ÷ 6, which equaled a corrected P value 
threshold of 0.008 (see the Supplementary Ap-
pendix). Secondary end points and analyses 
should be considered exploratory.
R esult s
Hospital and Market Characteristics
A total of 125 hospitals participated in the pro-
gram for CHF, 105 hospitals for pneumonia, 101 
hospitals for COPD, 88 hospitals for sepsis, and 
73 hospitals for AMI. Of these hospitals, 62.6% 
participated in more than one of these bundles 
(Table 1, and Table S2 in the Supplementary Ap-
pendix). Overall, as compared with the sample 
of all eligible U.S. hospitals, BPCI hospitals were 
more likely to be nonprofit, urban, teaching 
hospitals with a larger number of beds. The 
matched control hospitals were similar to the 
BPCI hospitals with respect to each of these 
characteristics, as well as market characteristics 
and condition-specific, Medicare-allowed pay-
ments at baseline (Table 1, and Table S2 in the 
Supplementary Appendix).
Changes in Medicare Payments
At baseline, the mean Medicare payment per 
episode across the five conditions for the BPCI 
hospitals was $24,280, which decreased to 
$23,993 during the intervention period (differ-
ence, −$286; P = 0.41) (Fig. 1 and Table 2). (Differ-
ences may not sum precisely because of round-
ing.) Control hospitals had a mean Medicare 
payment of $23,901 per episode at baseline, 
which decreased to $23,503 during the interven-
tion period (difference, −$398; P = 0.08; differ-
ence in differences, $112; P = 0.79). The findings 
were largely similar for exploratory analyses ex-
amining each of the individual conditions (Fig. 1, 
and Table S3 in the Supplementary Appendix). 
However, payments for pneumonia decreased by 
$1,495 for BPCI hospitals versus $278 for control 
hospitals (difference in differences, $1,216; 
P = 0.03), which was not significant after adjust-
ment for multiple comparisons.
Changes in Secondary Outcomes
The individual components of Medicare payments 
per episode, including payments for the index 
hospitalization, readmissions, skilled nursing 
facilities, inpatient rehabilitation, home health 
care, and physician fees, did not differ signifi-
cantly from baseline to the intervention period 
in the combined sample (Table 2). The findings 
were largely similar for exploratory analyses ex-
amining the individual conditions (Table S3 in 
the Supplementary Appendix).
In our combined analyses, patients in the 
BPCI hospitals and those in the control hospitals 
did not differ significantly with respect to 
changes from baseline to the intervention period 
in demographic characteristics or measures of 
medical or social risk. For example, in BPCI 
hospitals, the Chronic Conditions Warehouse 
score increased from 8.91 to 9.14, as compared 
with an increase from 8.94 to 9.10 in control 
hospitals (difference in differences, 0.07; P = 0.17) 
(Table 3). Findings were similar for the individ-
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ual conditions (Table S4 in the Supplementary 
Appendix).
There were no significant overall differences 
between BPCI hospitals and control hospitals in 
the change from baseline to the intervention 
period for length of stay, emergency department 
visits or readmissions within 30 or 90 days after 
discharge, or mortality within 30 or 90 days af-
ter admission (Table 4). For example, although 
both BPCI and control hospitals had increases in 
90-day mortality during the study period, the 
degree of increase did not differ significantly 
between the two types of hospitals. In BPCI 
hospitals, the increase was from 15.1 to 17.8% 
(difference, 2.8 percentage points; P<0.001), and 
in control hospitals, the increase was from 14.5 
to 17.0% (difference, 2.4 percentage points; 
P<0.001); the difference in differences was 0.3 
percentage points (P = 0.52). The findings were 
largely similar in exploratory analyses examin-
ing the individual conditions. However, in the 
AMI cohort, 90-day mortality decreased in BPCI 
hospitals relative to control hospitals, and in the 
COPD cohort, mortality at 90 days and the re-
admission rate at 30 days increased in BPCI hos-
pitals relative to control hospitals (Table S5 in the 
Supplementary Appendix).
Sensitivity Analyses
When we limited our sample to hospitals that did 
not drop out of BPCI, the findings were qualita-
tively similar, with the exception of a drop in 
quarterly volume for BPCI hospitals as compared 
with control hospitals (Tables S6, S7, and S8 in 
the Supplementary Appendix). Finally, to allow 
time for hospitals to incorporate care redesign, 
we excluded the first 6 months of the intervention 
period and examined changes thereafter. Again, 
the results were qualitatively similar, aside from 
an isolated differential decrease in spending on 
inpatient rehabilitation for BPCI hospitals (−$135) 
as compared with control hospitals ($40); differ-
ence in differences, −$175; P = 0.002 (Tables S9, 
S10, and S11 in the Supplementary Appendix).
Discussion
We found that hospital participation in episode-
based payment for the five most commonly 
selected medical conditions under BPCI, account-
Figure 1. Standardized, Medicare-Allowed Payments for Hospitals Participating and Those Not Participating in the Bundled Payments  
for Care Improvement (BPCI) Initiative.
Shown are baseline and intervention Medicare payments to BPCI hospitals and matched control hospitals. Costs have been adjusted  
for patient-level coexisting conditions on the basis of Medicare’s Chronic Conditions Warehouse data. COPD denotes chronic obstructive 
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ing for nearly two thirds of patients enrolled in 
medical bundles in this program, was not asso-
ciated with significant changes in total or com-
ponent Medicare episode payments, clinical com-
plexity, length of stay, emergency department use, 
readmissions, or mortality.
Our findings differ from the prior study of 
BPCI for total joint replacement, which showed 
that participating hospitals were successful in 
lowering overall Medicare payments.4 Medical 
bundles might differ from joint replacement in a 
few ways: joint replacement is elective, and pa-
tients tend to be younger (30% of patients were 
older than 80 years of age in the prior study of 
total joint replacement, whereas 55% of patients 
were over the age of 80 years in our cohort) and 
have lower rates of poverty and disability (12.7% 
of patients were dually enrolled and 10.5% were 
disabled in the study of joint replacement, 
whereas 25.1% were dually enrolled and 21.3% 
were disabled in our study).4 As a result of these 
complexities, patients admitted for medical con-
ditions may have had post–acute care needs that 
were less amenable to intervention.10-12 However, 
in analyses performed by the Lewin Group under 
a federal contract, payments for joint replace-
ments associated with fracture — presumably a 
nonelective procedure in a medically more com-
plex subgroup of patients undergoing joint re-
placement — were also lower for BPCI hospitals, 
suggesting that patient characteristics alone may 
not account for our findings.5
Medicare payments for the inpatient stay for 
any particular diagnosis are largely constant 
across hospitals under the DRG system. Conse-
quently, most savings under BPCI would need to 
come from post–acute care services.13,14 There-
fore, another possibility for the failure of BPCI 
hospitals to reduce allowed payments is a lack of 
ability to influence care provided by skilled nurs-
ing facilities, inpatient rehabilitation facilities, 
long-term care hospitals, or home health agen-
cies. In the absence of relationships with these 
providers, hospitals may have little say in what 
happens to patients once they enter a post–acute 
care setting. However, recent research suggests 
that partnerships between hospitals and post–
acute care providers are becoming more common.15
There have been prior studies of bundling, 
though few for medical conditions. In 1991, 
CMS introduced a 5-year demonstration project 
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pitals, which showed cost savings of about 10%, 
with reduced mortality and complication rates. 
In 2009, CMS launched the Acute Care Episode 
(ACE) demonstration project for cardiac and or-
thopedic care, which resulted in some savings 
for both types of care.16 More recently, national 
and single-center studies have shown savings for 
total joint replacement under BPCI,4,17,18 a single-
center study showed no savings in a COPD bundle 
under BPCI,19 and three annual federal evalua-
tions of BPCI reported qualitatively similar find-
ings to ours for medical conditions.5 Differences 
between the federal findings and ours are prob-
ably related to slight differences in baseline and 
follow-up periods, variables used in matching, 
selection of control hospitals, and availability of 
outpatient data.
There are limitations to our findings. First, 
BPCI is a voluntary program, and we examined 
only five conditions, so generalizability to other 
conditions or mandatory models is uncertain. 
Second, we focused on hospital participants; 
though they account for the majority of model 2 
participants,1 patterns may differ for physician 
practices that participate in the program. Third, 
our lists of hospital participants were obtained 
from CMMI and were not verified by the hospi-
tals themselves, which may have introduced error. 
Fourth, since CMMI has not released data on 
target pricing or on hospitals’ savings or losses 
under the program, we could evaluate only the 
effect of BPCI on patients and their outcomes, 
not its effect on hospital finances. We recom-
mend that interested parties view the federal 
reports5,6 for aggregate findings on hospital fi-
nances, as well as additional information gleaned 
from federally administered surveys of partici-
pants and patients.
Fifth, there are no validated risk-adjustment 
models for 90-day outcomes, so we adapted 30-
day models for that purpose. Sixth, we used a 
relatively short baseline period; during this pe-
riod, hospitals were surely aware that they were 
nearing the beginning of the intervention and 
may have been preparing to redesign care. How-
ever, our finding that baseline trends did not 
differ between intervention and control hospitals 
is reassuring. Also, since hospitals are judged 
against their own historical baseline, there was 
no incentive to begin reducing costs before the 
start date. Finally, we had a limited follow-up 
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sary to fully evaluate how care evolves.20 Never-
theless, similar follow-up with a similar sample 
size was sufficient for the prior study to identify 
an effect of BPCI on joint replacement.4
In summary, hospital participation in five 
common medical bundles under BPCI, as com-
pared with nonparticipation, was not associated 
with changes from baseline in total Medicare 
payments per episode, case complexity, length 
of stay, emergency department use, hospital re-
admission, or mortality. Bundling of services to 
encourage more efficient care has great face va-
lidity and enjoys bipartisan support. For such 
bundling to work for medical conditions, how-
ever, more time, new care strategies and partner-
ships, or additional incentives may be required.
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